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RUTH C. SILVA*
Last February, when President Eisenhower announced his candidacy for re-
election, he again urged the Congress to clarify that section of the Constitution
that provides for the exercise of presidential power when a President is disabled.
In view of the President's two illnesses, presidential succession and disability were
important-although not greatly discussed-issues during the campaign. A year
ago, Congressman Emanuel Celler released the replies he had received to a ques-
tionnaire dealing with the problem of the President's inability to exercise the powers
and discharge the duties of his office. The questionnaire sought opinion on pro-
cedures to be followed if such an emergency should arise. Replies to the ques-
tionnaire were conflicting and confusing. The suggestions offered included pro-
posals to empower the Congress, the Supreme Court, the National Security Council
or some special commission to determine when a President is disabled.'
As was pointed out at the time of President Eisenhower's heart attack, twice
before a President of the United States had been in ill health and his infirmity
had a marked effect on national policy. The Constitution provides that the powers
and duties of the Presidency shall devolve upon the Vice President in case of the
President's inability to discharge them and that an officer designated by Congress
shall act as President in case of removal, death, resignation, or inability of both
the President and Vice President 2 The Constitution does not, however, expressly
answer the three major questions that concerned Congressman Celler's subcommittee:
What is the status of one who acts as President because of the inability of the
President? What constitutes inability to discharge the powers and duties of the
presidential office? Who is to determine when an inability exists and when
it ceases? It is submitted that the Celler committee failed to get consistent answers
to these three questions because the committee chose to ignore altogether the more
basic problem of presidential succession.
The Vice President or officer designated by Congress may be called to act as
President either because of vacancy in the office of chief executive or because of the
incumbent's disability. In case of death, resignation, or removal, the presidential
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office is vacant; and, consequently, the problem of restoring the President to his
powers does not arise. In case of disability, however, the Presidency is not vacant;
and, therefore, the problem of restoring executive powers to the President is pre-
sented. This unavoidably raises questions relating to presidential status and tenure:
Does the successor become President? What is the status of the disabled President?
Is the President to resume the exercise of presidential power when his inability passes?
Soon after Vice President John Tyler succeeded to presidential power in 1841,
Senator William Allen, of Ohio, objected to establishing the precedent of the Vice
President's becoming President upon the death of the latter because he thought that
it would unnecessarily complicate the situation on some future occasion when a
President became disabled In the only two serious cases of presidential inability to
date, the Vice President was not called to act as President because of the fear that
he would become President and thereby supersede the disabled President for the
remainder of the term. As a result, the affairs of the executive branch were allowed
to drift. In effect, there was no chief executive. The problem of providing for the
exercise of presidential power during a period of inability would not be solved by
the enactment of a statute by means of which the disability could be decided. Un-
less the President's supporters were certain of his status following the inability,
they would probably resist any attempt to establish inability, regarding it as equiva-
lent to an action for removal of the disabled President from office. The first ques-
tion, therefore, is whether or not one who acts as President becomes the President
by virtue of the powers and duties devolved upon him.
Study of the records of the Federal Convention shows that it was never intended
that the Vice President or designated officer should become President under the
succession clause. When the draft Constitution went to the Committee of Style,
it contained two provisions dealing with presidential succession, one providing
that "the Vice President shall exercise those [the presidential] powers and duties,"
and the other empowering Congress to designate an officer to "act as President" in
certain cases. Each was modified by an adverbial clause limiting the tenure of the
acting President to the duration of the inability. The Committee of Style, which was
authorized to put the draft into clear and concise language but not to alter substantive
provisions, substituted "the same" for "powers and duties" and "devolve" for
"exercise"; so that the Constitution, as reported by the Committee, provided that
"the same shall devolve on the vice-president" and that the designated officer "shall
then act as President." 4 All other records of the Convention similarly indicate the
intended antecedent of "the same" as used in the succession clause to be "powers
and duties of the said office" rather than "said office."* Thus, the argument that
the presidential office, rather than its powers and duties, devolves on the Vice Presi-
a CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1841).
'See note 6 infra. For a more detailed consideration of the framing of the succession clause, see
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dent, who thereby becomes President, has no foundation in the records of the
Constitutional Convention.
Again, it was the efforts of the Committee of Style at consolidation which resulted
in combining the two succession provisions and in using the limiting clause, "until
the disability be removed," only once, instead of using it to modify each of the
preceding clauses separately. The Committee changed the semicolon to a comma,
however, so that the limiting clause would be part of a continuous sentence and,
therefore, refer alike to the succession of a Vice President and an "officer" designated
by Congress.6 Other provisions of the Constitution lend support to this interpreta-
tion. It is not once said that the Vice President shall become President but rather
that he shall act as President, that the presidential powers shall devolve upon him
and that he shall exercise the office of President.C The delegates to the ratifying
conventions and Hamilton in The Federalist used the same guarded language.8 If
any of them had thought that the President's successor would actually become the
President, it would have been easier to have said "become President" than to have
engaged in this circumlocution.
Seemingly oblivious to the intent of the Constitution, all seven Vice Presidents
who succeeded to presidential power have taken the presidential oath and have been
generally recognized as the de jure President of the United States. William Henry
Harrison was the first President to die in office; and it was then decided that the
Constitution provided that Vice President John Tyler should become the President
and serve until the end of the term for which Harrison had been elected. Exactly
how and by whom the decision was made is uncertain; but all evidence indicates that
the cabinet, whose ranking member was Daniel Webster, a constitutional lawyer
of no small repute, so decidedY Although Tyler thought himself qualified to exer-
' The draft appears in the left column and the clause as reported in the right:
Art. X, § 2: ". . . and in case of his removal as Art. II, § i: "In case of the removal of the
aforesaid, death, absence, resignation or inability president from office, or of his death, rcsigna-
to discharge the powers or duties of his office the tion, or inability to discharge the powers and
Vice President shall exercise those powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve
duties until another President be chosen, or until on the vice-president, (comma) and the Congress
the inability of the President be removed." Art. may by law provide for the case of removal,
X, § a: "The Legislature may declare by law death, resignation or inability, both of the presi-
what officer of the United States shall act as dent and vice-president, declaring what officer
President in case of the death, resignation, or dis- shall then act as president, (comma) and such
ability of the President and Vice President; officer shall act accordingly, until the disability
(semicolon) and such Officer shall act accord- be removed, or a President shall be elected." 2
ingly, until such disability be removed, or a id. 598-599, 626.
President shall be elected." 2 id. 575, 573.
U. S. CONST., art. I, § 3, cl. 5; art. II, § I, cl. 6; Id., XII and XX.
s Amendment proposed by the New York Convention, 2 JoNATHAN ELLIOT, DESATEs IN THE SEVERAL
STATES 408 (2d ed. 1866); Mason, Madison, and Monroe, 3 id. 487-90, 498; Martin, a id. 378. THE
FEDERALIST No. 68, at 427-28 (Lodge ed. 1892).
'SILVA, op. cit, supra note 4, at 14-31; 2 GEORGE TICKNOR Curtns, LIFE o DANIEL WEBSTER 67n
(1870). Thomas Ewing III, the grandson of Harrison's Secretary of the Treasury, wrote in a letter
to the N. Y. Times, Dec. io, 1921, p. 12, col. 7: "Mr. Webster expressed the opinion that even though
the President survived the period of inability and became capable of performing the duties of his office
during the term for which he was elected, he could not displace the Vice President who had assumed
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cise presidential power without any oath other than the one he had taken as Vice
President, he took the presidential oath so doubt could not arise concerning the
legality of his acts as chief executive.'0 Apparently Webster thought this was
the proper procedure, because he offered the resolution in i85o for the two Houses to
assemble for the administration of the presidential oath to Millard Fillmore. 1
Not all of Tyler's contemporaries approved of the decision that he had become
President. Many of the newspapers at the time viewed him merely as the Vice
President who was acting as President. Although they did not object to his taking
the presidential oath, no one argued that the taking of this oath actually made him
the President." Among those who agreed that Tyler had not become President
were John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay.' 3  Clay must have changed his mind,
however, for he voted with the majority eight weeks later, when both houses of
Congress, over the strong opposition of John McKeon, William Allen, and Benja-
min Tappen, recognized Tyler as President of the United States. 4 Within a few
weeks after Congress approved Tyler's succession, the whole matter was practically
forgotten.
The precedent set by Tyler has since been confirmed six times. The status and
the duties of that office." Then speaking of President Wilson's illness, Attorney Ewing said: "If that
opinion is correct there can be no temporary displacement of the President. This of course adds
greatly to the seriousness of the step in the event that the President has not died but is merely in-
capacitated." At the time Ewing wrote this letter, he possessed over seventy boxes, barrels, and suit-
cases of his grandfather's papers. These papers are now in the possession of the Library of Congress
but have not been sorted, indexed, or made available for research purposes. In 1947, Dr. Elizabeth
McPherson, a member of the Library's staff, examined six letter books, 2000 unbound letters, and a sixty-
five page journal covering the period of the elder Ewing's service in the Harrison-Tyler cabinet, but
found no reference to presidential succession. Whether the younger Ewing based his letter to the
New York Times on these papers is not known; but correspondence with the Ewing family confirms that
he was thoroughly familiar with the papers.
104 JaMEs D. RiCHARDsON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS oF aE PRESIDENTS 31-32 (1897); HERBERT W.
HORWILL, THE USAGES OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 70-71 (1925); 2 LYON TYLER, THE LETrERS
AND TIMES oF THE TYLERS 12 (1885); SAMUEL TYLER, MEMOIR OF ROGER BROOKE TANEY 295-296
(872); PETER R. LEVIN, SEVEN BY CHANCES ACCIDENTAL PRESIDENTS 27-28 (1948).
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tenure of Millard Fillmore, Chester A. Arthur, Theodore Roosevelt, Calvin Coolidge,
and Harry S. Truman have never been seriously questioned. At the time of An-
drew Johnson's impeachment, however, his presidential status was disputed; but
nobody suggested calling a special election to choose a President who would displace
him before the end of Lincoln's second term. The original resolution providing
for Johnson's impeachment styled him "Vice-President and acting President of the
United States." It seemed necessary, however, to recognize him as the President
in order to remove him.'5 Yet, it was Senator William Pitt Fessenden's conviction
that Lincoln's successor had actually become President which prevented Johnson's
removal.' Actually, the precedent according to which the Vice President becomes
President was confirmed by impeaching Johnson as President."7
Such was the established rule of succession in 188i when the first serious
case of presidential inability occurred. During the eighty days of President Gar-
field's fatal illness, he performed but one official act, the signing of an extradition
paper. The daily bulletins of his physicians are sufficient evidence that he was
unable to perform the duties of his office. While the President was disabled, there
was much urgent business calling for the immediate attention of the chief executive.
There were mail frauds; there were officers to be commissioned; the country's for-
eign relations were deteriorating; but only such routine business as could be
handled by the department heads without the President's supervision received
attention.' The question that most complicated the problem was whether or not
Vice President Arthur would become the President for the remainder of the term
if called to act in that capacity during Garfield's illness. Some respected legal
opinion held that the Vice President would assume the office in case of inability
" If Johnson were the President, Chief Justice Chase would preside; and the President pro tcmpore
of the Senate, Ben Wade, whose vote was necessary for conviction, would be a voting member of the
court. If, on the other hand, Johnson were merely the Vice President, Wade would preside and whether
he would have a vote or not was questionable. Although Wade would have become the acting Presi-
dent if Johnson had been removed, he not only sat as a member of the impeachment court but also
voted for removal. DAVID MILLER DEWirr, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL or ANDREW JOHNSON
152, 380, 390-93, 553, 576 (1903).
"0 The principal charge against Johnson was that he had violated the Tenure of Office Act by re-
moving Secretary of War Stanton, a Lincoln appointee, without the consent of the Senate. The act
provided that such removals could not be made without senatorial consent, but an appointee's title to
office expired one month after the expiration of the term of the President by whom the officer had been
appointed. If Johnson were still Vice President, he had removed Stanton during Lincoln's term and
thus had violated the act. If, on the other hand, Johnson had become President, Stanton's tenure had
expired, and, therefore, Johnson had not violated the law. Although George S. Boutwell argued that
Johnson was the President when the impeachment court was being established, he later argued that the
term of office was four years and that the powers and duties, not the office and its term, had devolved
upon Johnson. He said Johnson had no term, and it was during Lincoln's second term that Stanton
had been removed. Id. at 367-69, 411, 424-25. Senator Fessenden's vote was necessary for removal.
But the Senator from Maine thought Johnson had become President and, therefore, had not violated
the Tenure of Office Act. Consequently, he voted for acquittal. 2 FRANCIS FESSENDEN, WILL Am Plrr
FEsSENDEN 246-50 (1907).
17 2 GEORGE BOUTWELL, REMIINISCENCES OF SIXTY YEARS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS 113 (1902).
" GEoRGE F. HowE, CHESTER A. ARTHUR 152-53, 181 (934); N. Y. Herald, Sept. 1, I88I, p. .5,
col. 3, and p. 6, cols. 2-3; id., Sept. 5, 1881, p. 4, cols. 1-3, and p. 6, cols. 2-3; N. Y. Times, Aug.
II, I88I, p. I, col. 7, and p. 4 cols. 2-3.
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just as in case of vacancy and the powers and duties once devolved could not be
returned to the President when the disability was removed.' Although the great
weight of opinion favored the President's resumption of his powers and duties if
and when he recovered,20 the cabinet was impressed by the arguments to the con-
trary.
When it appeared that Garfield would recover, the cabinet met and discussed
the inability question. There was unanimous agreement on the desirability of
having Arthur act as President during Garfield's recuperation; but four of the
seven cabinet members thought there could be no temporary devolution of presi-
dential power on the Vice President. In view of this conflicting opinion, the cabinet
concluded that it would be unfair to advise Garfield to invite Arthur to act as
President without first presenting all of the questions for the President's considera-
tion because it might mean that they were asking the President to abdicate for the
rest of the term. All agreed that the President was too ill to have these questions
presented to him. The cabinet thought that the shock of taking any action on the
matter might cause his death. Consequently, the whole matter of succession and
inability was dropped.' Garfield's death made it unnecessary to solve the dilemma
in 1881; and the problem was not raised again until Wilson fell ill in i9i9.
Wilson's inability was probably more detrimental to the public interest than was
Garfield's, not only because it lasted longer, but also because it occurred during the
struggle over the League of Nations. There can be no question that Wilson was
unable to perform his presidential duties much of the time from September 25,
1919 to March 3, 1921. During the special session of the Sixty-sixth Congress,
twenty-eight acts became law due to the President's failure to pass on them within
the requisite ten days ' Wilson did not meet his cabinet for eight months during
his illness.23 The Senate Commttee on Foreign Relations was unable to get any
word or action from the President on the matter of the Shantung Settlement2 4
The Constitution says that the President shall receive the representatives of foreign
states, but Viscount Grey, the British Ambassador, spent four months in Washington
"9E.g., Dwight, Presidential Inability, 133 No. Ams. REV. 436 (I88I); former Judge Abram J.
Dittenhoefer, quoted in the N. Y. Herald, Sept. 13, I881, p. 5, cols. 1-2.
2 E.g., Butler, Presidential Inability, 133 No. Aas. REv. 428 (i881); Cooley, Presidential Inability, id.
at 422; Trumbull, Presidential Inability, id. at 417; Curtis, Presidential Inability, 25 HARPER'S WEEKLY
631 (x88 ); former Attorney General Jeremiah Black, Governor Alfred H. Littlefield, of R. I., and Gov-
ernor Hobard B. Bigelow, of Conn., quoted in the N. Y. Herald, Sept. 6, 1881, p. 5, col. I; Judge
Lyman Trumbull, id., Sept. 9, 1881, p. 8, cOl. 4; Judge (N. Y. S. Ct. 3d Jud. Div.) and Attorney General
A. Schoonmaker, Jr., of New York, id., Sept. X7, 1881, p. 6, cols. ]-2.
"Pittsburgh Post, Sept. 3, 88r, p. I, col. 2; N. Y. Tribune, Sept. 2, i88r, p. 5, col. 2. On Sept.
5, x88i, the Pittsburgh Post (p. I, col. 3) reported that Secretary of State James G. Blaine, Secretary
of the Navy William H. Hunt, and Secretary of War Robert T. Lincoln thought the Vice President
could temporarily act as President; but Attorney General Wayne MacVeagh, Posmaster General Thomas
L. James, Secretary of the Treasury William Windom, and Secretary of the Interior Samuel J. Kirk-
wood were of the contrary opinion.2
"Rogers, The President's Illness, 14 Ams. POL. Set. REV. 87 (920).
23 2 DAVID HousToN, EIGHT YEARS WITH WILSON'S CABINET 69-70 (1926); DAVID LAWRENCE, THE
TRUE STORY OF WOODROW WILSON 298 (924).
" N. Y. Times, Oct. 14, 5919, p. 1, col. 7.
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without seeing the President once2 At one time, Senator Gilbert M. Hitchcock,
the Democratic leader in the Senate, thought he might be able to get the Republicans
to compromise on the Versailles Treaty, but Wilson's physicians refused to let him
see the President, and, as Hitchcock said, he had to consult with the President before
the Democratic Senators could do anything.26 Although it was reported five days
later that Hitchcock had seen the President three times,27 it was plainly evident
that there was a disabled President in the White House. Many students of the
period agree that public business in general, the fate of the treaty in particular, was
affected by the President's isolation from public opinion, from his advisers, and from
congressional leaders2
Public affairs were conducted much as they had been during Garfield's illness.
Either presidential powers and duties were not discharged or were handled in such
manner as the cabinet, the President's family, and his personal entourage could de-
vise. There seems to be almost unanimous agreement that state papers were given
to Mrs. Wilson first. If she had any doubt concerning the effect they would have
on her husband, she submitted them to Dr. Cary T. Grayson, Wilson's physician. If
Dr. Grayson thought the President was strong enough to pass judgment on them
without injuring his health, they were shown to him. If not, they were deferred or
passed on to Secretary of the Treasury David Houston or to a few others in whom
Mrs. Wilson had confidence20 That this situation existed was rather widely known
at the time; yet there was no serious movement of the devolution of presidential
power on Vice President Thomas R. Marshall.
The possibility of inviting Marshall to act as President was discussed several
times. On March i, 1920, the House Committee on the Judiciary held hearings on
three bills and one proposed constitutional amendment for the declaration of such
an inability. The hearings served only to bring out almost insurmountable consti-
tutional problems, the most difficult of which was whether the President could be
restored to his powers and duties when he recovered. Authorities were cited on
both sides of the question, but the Committee could reach no conclusion and re-
ported none of the measures30 At another time, the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations sent Senators Albert Fall and Gilbert Hitchcock as a special subcommittee
to interview the President and determine the truth or falsity of the many rumors
" HORWILL, op. cit. supra note io, at 8o-8i.
"
8N. Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1919, p. 1, col. 4.
2
7 1d., Dec. 5, 1919, P. I, cols. 6-7.
284 CHARLES SEmioTR, THE INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE 5o6"07, 509-12 (x928); LAW-
RENCE, op. cit. supra note 23, at 299; EDITH G. REI, WOODROW VILSON 224-30 (1934); WILLIAM ALLEN
WITE, WOODROW WILSON 448-50 (925); JoHN K. WINKLER, WOODROW WILSON 286-99 (1933).9 Mrs. Wilson herself confirms much of this. EDITH BOLLINO WILSON, MY MEMioIS 288-90 (1938),
as does David Houston, the cabinet member in whom Mrs. Wilson had the most confidence. 2 HousroN,
op. cit. supra note 23, at 6o-66. See also IRWIN HoovER, FORT-TWO YEARS IN THE WHITE HousE 1o5-o6
(1934); LAWRENCE, op. cit. supra note 23, at 283-309; REID, op. cit. supra note 28, at 224"30; WINKLER,
op, ct. supra note 28, at 287-88. See especially JOSEPH P. TUmULTY, WOODROW WILSON AS I KNEW HM
437-38 (1921).
"
0 Hearings before Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 12609, 12629, z2647, and H. 1. Rel. 297,
66th Cong., 2d Sess. (1920).
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that he was in no physical or mental condition to attend to important public busi-
ness. They were with the President forty minutes, found him in bed but mentally
alert; and the visit came to nothing.3
The cabinet also considered asking the Vice President to act as President; but
the White House circle fought the moveY2 When Secretary of State Robert
Lansing suggested this possibility, Joseph P. Tumulty, the President's secretary, was
indignant and reproached Lansing for his lack of devotion to Wilson. Tumulty
quotes himself as saying: 33
You may rest assured that while Woodrow Wilson is lying in the White House on the
broad of his back I will not be a party to ousting him. He has been too kind, too
loyal, and too wonderful to me to receive such treatment at my hands.
Tumulty's objection to the devolution of executive power on the Vice President
seems to have been based on the thought that it would displace Wilson. The
President apparently took the same view. Tumulty quotes Wilson as declaring on
the occasion of Lansing's forced resignation :34 "Tumulty, it is never the wrong time
to spike disloyalty. When Lansing sought to oust me, I was upon my back. I am
on my feet now and I will not have disloyalty about me."
Because of the fear that a succeeding Vice President would displace the disabled
President, the cabinet, in Garfield's case, and the White House circle, in Wilson's
case, decided on the basis of personal loyalty to the disabled President that no disa-
bility existed. And both decisions were contrary to fact. The usage by which
the Vice President is transformed into a President has practically nullified the consti-
tutional provision for the administration of executive power when a President be-
comes incapacitated. It is important, therefore, to consider the reasoning by which
the precedent has been sustained in case of the President's death, and by what
logic it has been extended to the case of his inability.
In substantiation of the thesis that the Vice President becomes President when
there is a vacancy or inability in the superior office it is said that the Constitution
itself provides that the presidential office, not merely its powers and duties, shall
devolve upon the Vice President.35 The argument runs that not only is this true
grammatically, but that the framers of the Constitution intended it to be the case.
In answer to this assertion, it can be pointed out that syntactically "the same," as
"N. Y. Times, Dec. 6, i919, p. I, col. 5. See also Hitchcock's account of this incident, JOHN M.
MATHEWS and CLARENcE A. BERDAHL, DOCUMENTS AND READINGS IN AmERICAN GOVERNMENT 111-13
(1928).
32 2 HouSroN, op. cit. supra note 23, at 37-39; TumustTY, op. cit. supra note 29, at 443-46.
=aId. at 443-44 (emphasis added).
aId. at 445 (emphasis added). In 1885, Wilson wrote that the Vice President's importance consists
in that he may cease to be Vice President. WooDRow WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMIEN'r 240-41
(1885). See also REiD, op. cit. supra note 28, at 223.
"For a general exposition of the thesis that the Vice President actually becomes President, see, for
example: Wise and Walker, CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., ist Sess. 4-5 (1841); Jones, 13 CONG. RcE. J42
(s88x) and 14 id. at 918 (z883); Hannis Taylor, 57 CONG. REc. 28 (i918); Justice Samuel B. Blatch-
ford's dictum in Merriam v. Clinch, 17 Fed. Cas. No. 9460, at 70 (S. D. N. Y. 1867). See also note
i9 supra.
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used in the succession clause, may refer to "powers and duties of the said office" as
well as to "said office."" In reply to the contention that the framers of the Consti-
tution intended the office as well as its powers and duties to pass to the Vice Presi-
dent, it is necessary only to point to the records of the Federal Convention. Al-
though the framers of the Constitution intended "the same shall devolve on the
Vice President" to be equivalent to "the Vice President shall exercise those powers
and duties," the difference in language used in the two parts of the succession clause
is frequently cited to buttress the proposition that a Vice President becomes President
when called to act as such. It is claimed that in case of single vacancy, the office
devolves upon the Vice President for the remainder of the term, but in case both
the Presidency and Vice Presidency are vacant, the designated officer acts as President
ad interim.
It has been asserted that the adverbial clause, "until the disability be removed,
or a President shall be elected," modifies only the clause providing for an officer
to act as President. Some have even gone so far as to say that the limiting clause
is separated by a semicolon from the clause providing for the succession of the Vice
President and refers, therefore, only to the officer who might be designated to act as
President. In consequence, they argue, once the Vice President succeeds, he takes
the office without limitation for the remainder of the term. It is absurd to hold
that the adverbial clause, "until the disability be removed," limits the tenure of a
designated officer who acts as President but does not apply to the Vice President
who becomes President. As the New York Tribune asked editorially: What kind of
sense does it make to say that, if the President becomes ill, the Vice President re-
places him for the rest of the term; but, if the Vice President who has suceeded the
President also becomes ill, he can resume the exercise of presidential power when
he recovers?
8
Some have tried to escape this conclusion by arguing that the office devolves on
the Vice President in case of vacancy in the Presidency, but in case of disability, only
its powers and duties devolve on him for the duration of the inability 9  The
difficulty is that the Constitution makes no distinction between the status of one
who succeeds because of vacancy and of one who succeeds because of inability.
" It is a rule of Latin grammar that the immediately preceding noun is the antecedent of the relative
that follows, in which case "the same" would refer to "office." Accepted English usage, however,
does not always conform to this rule, nor did it in the period when the Constitution was written. In
English the antecedent is frequently the last grammatical unit used as a substantive, in which case the
antecedent would be "powers and duties of the said office." 8 JAIMIES MURRAY, A NEw ENGLISH DICTIONARY
ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES (Pt. 2) 75 (933).
" For a general exposition of the thesis that the successor does not become President, but merely
acts in that capacity, see, for example: McKeon, Allen, and Tappen, CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., ist Sess.
3-5 (x841); Maxey, 13 CONG. REc. 129 (1881); Lapham, 14 CONG. REc. 918 (1883); Davis, Inability
of the President, S. DoC. 308, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. (1918); Leavitt, A Solution of the Presidential In-
ability Problem, 8 A. B. A. J. 189 (1922).
"
8 Aug, 16, 1881, p. 4, col. 3.
"
9 E.g., Cooley, supra note 2o, at 422-424; Curtis, Presidential Inability, 25 HARPER'S WEEVL 583
(188I); Fulton, Presidential Inability, 24 ALBANY L. J. 286-287 (1881); the colloquy between Repre-
sentatives Walsh and Fess, Hearings, supra note 3o, at 40.
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The same thing devolves in both cases.4 ° Others have tried to evade this difficulty
by saying that the Vice President becomes President in case of inability just as in
case of vacancy, but ceases to be President when the disability is removed.4 ' The
trouble with this position is that it creates the anomaly of two Presidents at once
or necessitates the removal of the disabled President. It also requires the removal
of the second President at the termination of the first President's inability; yet the
only method for removal of a President from office is impeachment by the House
and conviction by the Senate.
If one holds that a succeeding Vice President does not become President, he is
not troubled by these inconsistencies.42 He does not have to explain why seven
"Presidents" have had a term of less than four years while the Constitution provides
a four-year term for the President unless he dies, resigns, or is removed before the
expiration of that term. There is no need for distinguishing between a Vice Presi-
dent upon whom presidential power devolves and an officer who acts as President.
There is no need for distinguishing between vacancy and inability. In all cases, the
successor merely acts as President ad interim. This view greatly simplifies the prob-
lem of handling cases of disability because it allows the Vice President to act as
President for the duration of the inability without displacing the President or without
causing the anomaly of two Presidents. This allows the Vice President to discharge
the presidential functions as a part of his vice-presidential duties and to do so under
his oath as Vice President. As Senator Elbridge G. Lapham said in 1883, the Vice
President commits himself to faithfully discharge the dudes of the office of Vice
President, one of which is to perform the functions of the Presidency when they
devolve upon him because of vacancy or inability in the superior office.43
The objection to this interpretation of the succession clause is that the Consti-
tution vests executive power in the President and, thus, by implication, forbids its
exercise by anyone who is not actually the President. The Constitution commands
that the President shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed. Specific grants
of executive power are made to him. Attorney General Caleb Cushing thought the
President, the man holding the presidential office, and he alone, could exercise the
executive powers specifically granted in the Constitution, that the act of signing and
'"None of the various drafts of the Constitution distinguished between the status of one who
succeeds in case of vacancy and of one who succeeds because of inability, nor is there anything in the
records of the Convention to indicate that such a distinction was intended. All of the records show
that the devolution of power was intended only for the duration of the inability. 3 Fautm, op. cit.
supra note 5, at 6oo; 2 id. at 172, x86, 495, 499, 532, 535, 573, 598-99, 659.
"
1 1E.g., former judge Elias Griswold, quoted in the N. Y. Herald, Sept. 9, i88i, p. 8, col. 5"
"For a more detailed consideration of the law and logic of the presidential succession precedent, see
SILVA, OP. cit. supra note 4, at 31-47 and 67-81.
43 14 CONG. Rac. 918-919 (x883). The Constitution requires the President to take the oath; but
in case of an acting President, one may ask whether his taking the oath is a legal obligation or mere
custom. It seems to be assumed that the taking of the presidential oath is a prerequisite to the exercise
of presidential power and transforms a Vice President into a President; but it is contended at the
same time that the officer designated by Congress would not become President, although, presumably,
the same oath would be a prerequisite to his exercise of presidential power also. See supra note ii.
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vetoing bills was a personal act of the President and could not be exercised by any
other person 4 Although the Supreme Court has upheld the delegation of certain
powers by the President to the department heads and has said that their acts are pre-
sumed to be his and are binding within the sphere of the President's legal and consti-
tutional authority," the courts have denied to anyone the right to exercise for the
President a power which from the nature of the case requires the President's per-
sonal judgment.4 6 A study of the cases in which the delegation of executive power
has been upheld will show that, in every case, the power in question was one granted
to the President by statute. Not once has the Court upheld the delegation of power
vested directly in the President by the Constitution. As Professor Edward S. Corwin
says, the Constitution knows a single executive power, that of the President, whose
duty it is to see that the laws be faithfully executed, a duty which legally is equiva-
lent to the obligation and power to execute them personally. 4
The argument that the vesting clause, as interpreted by the courts, requires one
to become President in order to exercise those powers vested in the President alone
is not unanswerable. The restrictions laid down by the courts apply to the delegation
of executive power by the President to his subordinates and should not by analogy
be extended to the devolution of this power in such a way as to defeat the purpose
of the succession clause. The records of the Federal Convention give no indication
that the framers of the vesting clause intended to preclude the possibility of an
acting President in case of vacancy or inability in the Presidency. Their sole pur-
pose in writing the vesting clause appears to have been the establishment of a single,
as contrasted with a plural, executive.48 The purpose of the succession clause seems
to have been to provide a substitute for the President in certain cases, not to provide.
for the creation of another President. The rule is well established that the different
clauses should be given effect and reconciled if possible!' The conclusion is,
therefore, that the clause vesting executive power in the President should be con-
strued in such a way as to allow for an acting President who will exercise executive
power in case of the President's removal, death, resignation, or inability until the
disability passes or another President is elected.
Obversely, the succession clause should be interpreted in a manner which will
"47 Ops. A-r'Y GEN. 464-70 (1855).
457 Ops. A7rr'Y GEN. 453, 460 (1855). Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U. S. (13 Pet.) 498, 513 (1839);
United States v. Eliason, 41 U. S. (x6 Pet.) 291, 302 (1842); Williams v. United States, 42 U. S. (I
How.) 290, 296-97 (1843); Confiscation Cases, 87 U. S. (2o Wall.) 92, 109 (1874); Wolsey v. Chap-
man, 1o U. S. 755, 769-70 (1879); Runkle v. United States, 122 U. S. 543, 557 (1887); United
States v. Fletcher, 148 U. S. 84, 88-91 (1893); United States ex rel. French v. Weeks, 259 U. S. 326,
334 (1922).
"Ex parte Field, 9 Fed. Gas. No. 476!, at. 5 (D. Va. 1862); Runkle v. United States, supra note
45 at 557; United States v. Page, 137 U. S. 673, 68o-8s (189i); United States v. Fletcher, supra note
45 at 88-91.
"CoRwI, op. cit. supra, note ii, at 76-82, 351-53.
48 1 FARRAND, op. cit. supra, note 5, at 21, 63, 70, 72, 73, 79, 88, 90, 92, 93, 96, 105, 106, 109, 225,
230, 236, 244, 247, 254, 26i, 266, 272, 292; 2 id. at 22, 29, 100-01, xx6, 132, 134, 135, 145, 158, 171,
185, 401, 572, 597, 657; 3 id. at 132, 347; 4 id. at 17, 46.
"'Schick v. United States, 195 U. S. 65, 68 (r904).
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give effect to the purpose of the vesting clause. This means that there can be no
partial devolution of executive power on a Vice President or on a statutory suc-
cessor while some of this power continues to be exercised by the President. Senators
James B. Beck and Richard Coke, Attorney John Brooks Leavitt, and former
President William Howard Taft suggested that the extent of the power which de-
volves is measured by the nature and and duration of a President's inability.5° It
seems, however, that the vesting clause precludes such an interpretation of the suc-
cession clause. As George Ticknor Curtis pointed out during the illness of Presi-
dent Garfield, executive power is a unit and is vested entirely in one man. This
means that if the incumbent of the office cannot discharge all of its powers and
duties, although he may be able to discharge some of them, either all or none of the
said powers and duties devolve on his successor." Since it is the purpose of the
vesting clause to create a single executive,52 and since constitutional provisions
are not to be nullified without regard to the aims and objects of the instrument and
the principles on which it is based,53 we must reject an interpretation of the suc-
cession clause that would split the exercise of executive power. The proper view
seems to be that executive power is a unit, a continuing power unbroken by suc-
cession-that there be one person legally authorized to exercise this power at all
times, although he may not always be the incumbent of the presidential office and
may not always have a term of four years.
It has been suggested that judicial interpretation of the vesting clause in cases
involving the delegation of executive power prohibits the exercise of certain executive
powers by an acting President. It has also been suggested that such a power as
the veto power is vested in the President alone, and, consequently, such powers
1o At the time of Wilson's trip to Europe, former President William Howard Taft suggested that Wilson
could exercise the foreign relations power in Paris. If an emergency arises, Taft said, Vice President
Marshall, in his capacity as acting President, could exercise those powers related to domestic affairs which
Wilson's foreign duty prevented him from exercising. 57 CONG. REc. 1i9-2o (1918). See the xemarks
of Beck and Coke, 13 CONG. REc. 124 and 140 (i8i), respectively; and Leavitt, supra note 37, at
x9o. Leavitt said in 1923, shortly after President Harding's death, that the Presidency is too heavy
a responsibility for one man, and he attributed Harding's death to this fact. Leavitt suggested that the
succession clause provides for the partial devolution of presidential power on the Vice President when the
pressure of multifarious duties causes a partial inability on the part of a President. Leavitt said that
all a President needs to do in order to secure the Vice President's help is to ask for his assistance, in
which case those duties which the President is unable to perform will devolve on the Vice President.
N. Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1923, p. 8, col. 7. Presidential candidate Thomas E. Dewey suggested in 1948
that the Vice President might be made a kind of assistant President. It seems, however, that the Vice
President would always act for the President, in his name, and subject to his direction. Consequently,
the principles involved would be agency and delegation rather than devolution.
" Curtis, supra note 39, at 583. Curtis thought that, since this was true, the inability of a Presi-
dent to discharge any of his powers was an "inability" within the meaning of the succession clause and
all of his powers should then devolve on the Vice President. See also Cole, To What Extent Can the
President of the United States Perform the Duties of His Offie While Abroad?, 4 MAss. L. Q. 18o, 193
(igig); Miller, Some Legal Aspects of the Visit of President Wilson to Paris, 36 HARv L. REV. 55, 78
(1922).
"
5 See note 48 supra; also THE FEUERALISTr, op. cit. supra note 8, Nos. 70 and 71 at 436-50.
"' Aldrich v. Kinney, 4 Conn. 380, 385 (1822); People v. Dawell, 25 Mich. 247, 261 (1872).
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would be dormant during periods of vacancy or inability in the presidential office. 4
Such a doctrine must be disallowed because executive power can never be dormant.
The public welfare requires that there be someone at all times to exercise this
power. In law, executive power is a continuing one which never ends and which
is not broken by succession. This power can never be allowed to lapse. All executive
powers, therefore, may be exercised by a Vice President or statutory successor during
periods of vacancy or inability. Furthermore, his acts have behind them all the
force of the constitutional and statutory provisions in effect at the time."'
If it is recognized that the Vice President does not become President in case of
the President's disability, the problem of what constitutes inability is less formidable,
since the disabled President would not be thought to have forfeited his office.
Nearly all of those who hold that the Constitution provides only for an inability of
a permanent character extending throughout the remainder of the term hold also
that, once the inability is established, the Vice President becomes President for the
unexpired portion of the term. If the Vice President actually displaces the in-
capacitated President for the duration of the term, only the most extended disabilities
should be held to fall within that class of inabilities which devolve presidential power
on the Vice President. If the Vice President merely acts as President for the dura-
tion of the inability, however, restriction to inabilities extending throughout die
entire term seems unnecessary. Moreover, this view relieves us from trying to be
prophets who will determine whether an ill President will recover and precisely how
long his recuperation will take.
Even if duration is ruled out as a limitation on the meaning of inability, there
is still no unanimous agreement on the definition of this word. Some hold that
it is limited to mental incapacity, while others believe it covers any disability, what-
ever the cause. During Garfield's illness, there was an impressive body of opinion
that held that the only disability recognized by the Constitution was intellectual
incapacity. Theodore Dwight, Professor of Constitutional Law at Columbia Col-
lege, applied the common law which defined the term as mental inability. He said
that it was such an incapacity as a civil court would recognize as unfitting a man
to make a grant, but not including physical disability, such as an arm injury making
it necessary to have a deputy sign for him." Former Senator William W. Eaton, a
recognized authority on the Constitution, stated that the succession clause pro-
vided for no disability of which the President could be aware and was amazed at
64In 88, Senator Maxey of Texas implied that these powers were dormant by insisting that the
veto power was vested in the President alone and cannot be exercised by an acting President and yet
insisting also that one who exercises executive power under the succession clause is merely the acting
President. 13 CoNG. Rac. 128-34 (I881).
5 5 McCluskey v. Hunter, 33 Ariz. 513, 518-i9, 266 Pac. 18, 20 (1928); Barrett v. Duff, 114 Kan. 220,
223, 217 Pac. 918, 919-2o (1923); State ex rel. Matson v. O'Hern, 104 Mont. 126, 152, 65 P. 2d
6xg, 63z (1937); In re An Act Concerning Alcoholic Beverages, 13o N. J. L. 123, 129, 31 A. 2d 837, 840
(1943); Ex parfe Hawkins, io Okla. Crim. 396, 399-400, 136 Pac. 99r, 993 (1913); Ex parte Crump,
io Okla. Crim. 133, 144-53, 135 Pac. 428, 433-36 (1913).
5' DwIGrr, op. cit. supra note ig, at 436-39.
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the suggestion that the President could decide his own disability. The "inability,"
he held, must be one such as insanity, which is patent to everyone except the Presi-
dent. As long as the President possesses reason, said Eaton, he is not disabled in
the constitutional sense. 57  Secretary of the Interior Samuel J. Kirkwood likewise
thought the Constitution provided only for mental inability, an opinion with which
Senator Joseph E. McDonald, of Indiana, Governor Shelby M. Cullum, of Illinois,
and Judge Lyman Trumbull agreed.58
There is an equally respectable body of opinion that holds that inability is not
restricted to mental incapacity. If the public interest suffers because the President
is unable to exercise his powers, whatever the cause, a case of inability exists.
Benjamin Butler, writing with reference to Garfield's illness, said that inability is
obvious to any right thinking person. If an emergency arises and the President
is unable to act, the Vice President is to assume presidential power.59 Among those
who have thus broadly defined "inability" are Congressman George M. Robeson,
Judge Elias Griswold, Senator Elbridge G. Lapham, George Ticknor Curtis, and
Attorney John Brooks Leavitt ° There is an abundance of conflicting opinion on
the meaning of the term, but none is authoritative. The records of the Federal
Convention and the commentators on the Constitution throw no light on the ques-
tion. Since there are no authorities to whom one can turn for a definition of "ina-
bility," the term must be defined on the bases of general principles of law and rules
governing constitutional interpretation.
To restrict the meaning of inability to mental incapacity would deprive the
United States of a chief executive in case of the President's physical disability, on
his capture by the enemy in time of war, and on other occasions when the President
is mentally competent, yet physically unable to exercise his powers. A definition of
inability that fails to provide for the exercise of executive power at all times is
contrary to the legal principle that executive power is a continuing one, never ending,
never dormant, never allowed to lapse, and that there must be someone at all times
to exercise the power.1 The courts say that where words admit different meaning,
the one consonant with the object in view is to be selected, that words are to be taken
in their obvious sense and not in a sense unreasonably restricted, and that the
Constitution must receive a practical constructionP2  These well-established rules
point to a definition of "inability" that covers all cases in which the President is,
in fact, unable to exercise a power that the public interest requires to be exercised.
67 N. Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1881, p. 1, col. 3-
' Kirkwood, Boston Evening Transcript, July i6, i88i, p. 2, cOl. 3; McDonald, id., Aug. 19, i88i,
p. 2, col. 2; Cullum and Trumbull, New York Herald, Sept. 9, 188i, p. 8, col. 4.
"' Butler, supra note 20, at 428-3o . See also COLE, op. cit. supra note 51, at 194.
" Robeson, N. Y. Tribune, Sept. 2, i88i, p. 5, col. i; Griswold, supra note 41; Lapham, 14 CONG.
REc. 919 (1883); Leavitt, supra note 37, at igo and his letter to the N. Y. Times, Dec. 6, i92i, p. 18,
col. 6; Curtis, supra note 39, at 583.
" See note 55 supra.
"'Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 158 U. S. 6ox, 6x8 (1895); Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 85
U. S. (18 Wall.) 5, 31 (1873); see note 53 supra.
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The cause and duration of the inability are immaterial; the question is one of fact.
This conclusion would mean that some illnesses and absences are inabilities, while
others are not. In time of war, for example, an illness of a few days may be more
serious than one of several months at another time. With the development of
rapid communication and transportation, absence would not usually be an in-
ability in fact. Although the records of the Philadelphia Convention show that the
Vice President was intended to exercise presidential power during the President's
absence, usage has established that mere absence from the United States is not a
disability within the meaning of the Constitution." This is not to say, however, that
some absences might not be inabilities. The answer in a particular case would
depend on the facts. Even if Congress possesses the power, it probably cannot define
inability before its occurrence in such a way as to cover every contingency. 4 The
most Congress can do is to declare that the term "inability" shall cover all cases in
which the President is in fact unable to exercise the powers and discharge the duties
of his office. The only effect of such a declaration would be to put congressional
approval on well-established principles of law and constitutional interpretation and
to guide those who must determine if an inability exists in a particular case.
The final problem concerns who shall decide when a disability on the part of the
President exists. The records of the Constitutional Convention do not reveal the
intention of the framers of the succession clause on this subject. John Dickinson
raised the question, but none of his colleagues offered an answer."' In 1881, when
President Garfield was incapacitated, the great weight of opinion favored the theory
that the successor is to determine when the President is disabled. Adherents of this
position say that the Vice President is obligated to exercise the power and perform
03 The succession clause as referred to the Committee of Style provided for five cases: removal,
death, absence, resignation, and inability. 2 FtARRNI, op. cit. supra note 5, at 575. The provision
for the exercise of presidential power during the President's absence was deleted by the Committee, which
had no authority to change substantive provisions; and there is no record that the Convention was aware
of this change. 2 id. at 598-99. Since absence is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, the
question is whether or not it is covered by the term "inability." For a consideration of this question,
see SILvA, op. cit. supra note 4, at 92-98.
"There has never been unanimous agreement on the power of Congress to deal with inability.
One position is that the only power granted to Congress is to declare what officer shall act as President
in case of vacancy or inability in both the Presidency and Vice Presidency, and untder tho rule of
inclusio uniuts, exclusio alterius, Congress has no other powers in the field of presidential succession. 3
W. W. WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1467-68 (1929); Butler,
supra note 2o, at 431-33; Daugherty, Presidential Succession Problems, 42 Forum 523, 525 (1909);
DAvIs, op. cit. supra note 37, at 13-15; Lavery, Presidential Inability, 8 A. B. A. J. 13-17 (1922).
The other position is that the elastic clause gives Congress power to implement the inability clause,
since this is a power necessary and proper to carry into execution the executive power and guarantee
that it shall not become dormant. 2 JOHN RANssousr TucKER (a strict constructionist), THE CoNsTz-
trUrIoN F THE UNITED STATES 713 (x899); Cooley, supra note 2o, at 425-27; Curtis, supra note
2o, at 631 and note 39, at 583; Judge Samuel Shellabarger and Governor John Davis Long quoted
in the N. Y. Herald, Sept. 5, I88z, p. 8, cols. 1-2; former Attorney General A. Schoonmaker, Jr.,
sura note 20; Congressman George M. Robeson, supra note 6o; former Vice President Schuyler Colfax,
N. Y. Tribune, Sept. 8, x881, p. 5, col. 3; Representative Clifton N. McArthur thought the elastic clause
gave Congress the power to define inability just as it gave Congress power to define "interstate com-
merce" and "intoxicating liquor." Hearings, supra note 30, at 35.
632 FARRAND, op. cit. supra note 5, at 427.
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the duties of the Presidency when the President is disabled, just as it is his duty to
preside in the Senate, and no enabling action by the courts, the Congress, the cab-
inet, or the President is necessary.68 Judge Trumbull said there is no need for
providing a formal means of determination. In Trumbull's opinion, the inability
must be so notorious that no one can reasonably doubt its existence. In such a
case, he said, the Vice President is authorized to assume the executive power if
important public business requires executive action. When these conditions exist,
continued the Judge, the cabinet should notify the Vice President just as in case
of the President's death but there is no constitutional requirement for this notifica-
tion. It is only custom in case of the President's death and desirable in case of his
inability. It is extralegal and adds nothing to the Vice President's right to exercise
presidential power.67
Trumbull is probably correct in saying that the decision belongs to the successor
in the first instance. Since the duty of acting as President under certain conditions
of fact is imposed upon him, his official discretion extends to the determination of
whether the condition exists or not. It is a well-established rule of law that, in
contingent grants of power, the one to whom the power is granted is to decide when
the emergency has arisen. Thus, the Vice President or the officer designated by law
to act as President is constituted the judge of the executive's inability in the first
instance and is bound to act according to his interpretation of the facts. Someone
must decide whether the President is disabled; and, since the Constitution mentions
only the successor, he is the judge of the facts.68 If past experience can be taken
as a reliable indication of the attitude of future successors, the danger of their usurp-
ing the President's powers on the pretext of inability is slight indeed. The judgment
of both Vice Presidents Arthur and Marshall was conditioned by their sense of
propriety. These two cases indicate that the real problem is not how to guard
against the successor's abuse of power, but how to relieve him of the embarrassing
duty of taking the initiative.
It seems certain that no court has power to issue a writ of mandamus to the Vice
President or designated officer directing him to act as President during the latter's
inability because a court can only order the performance of a ministerial function.69
Perhaps the courts can pass on the validity of some executive action taken by the
successor and thereby indirectly on the inability of the President, if properly raised
4GE.g., Butler, supra note 2o, at 431-33; DAvis, op. cit. supra note 37, at i3-i5; Governor Thomas A.
Hendricks, N. Y. Herald, Aug. 21, i88i, p. 7, col. ",; Long, Shellabarger, and Schoonmaker, supra note
64; Congressman George M. Robeson, Boston Evening Transcript, Sept. 2, i881, p. i, col. 6; former
Senator William W. Eaton, supra note 57; Senator Augustus H. Garland, 13 CONG. REC. 139 (i88i);
Sentor Elbridge G. Lapham, X4 CONG. REe. 917 (1883).
" Trumbull, supra note 20, at 420-22.
" Martin v. Mott, 25 U. S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 31-32 (1827); Aurora v. United States, ii U. S. (7
Cranch) 382 (1813); Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 682-94 (189x); Hampton & Co. v. United States,
276 U. S. 394, 405-10 (1928). See also Disability of the President, 23 LAw NoTas 141-42 (1919).
"Gaines v. Thompson, 74 U. S. (7 Wall.) 347 (1869); Dudley v. James, 83 Fed. 345 (C. C. D. Ky.
1897); Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867); Carrick v. Lamar, ii6 U. S. 423, 426
(x886). See also Cole, supra note 51, at 194.
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in a case involving individual rights;70 but this would do nothing to alleviate the
Vice President's delicate position in making the determination in the first place.
Whether Congress has power either to determine actual inability or to provide a
means of deciding such cases is questionable. Opinion on the matter is divided, but
the weight of opinion seems to be that Congress has no such power. Congress is
given the power to name a successor to act as President after the Vice President,
and this probably excludes all other congressional power to deal with presidential
succession 1
The Congress could, however, relieve the successor of the embarrassment of
taking the initiative by passing a concurrent resolution requesting him to act as
President or by authorizing some officer or officers to inquire into the President's
inability and report thereon to the successor. The actual decision would still rest
with the successor, where the Constitution vests it, and his decision would not
await or be bound by the report. The investigation could properly be made by the
cabinet or the National Security Council because the cabinet or Security Council
consists of the President's appointees who are not eager to displace him; and these
bodies are in the best position to know the facts. Once it is recognized that the
successor does not supersede a disabled President for the remainder of the term,
the President might usually invite his successor to act for him for the duration of his
inability. But if the President could not or would not do so, the successor should
decide on the President's inability with or without a report from the cabinet or
National Security Council.
This would answer the questions John Dickinson raised in the Constitutional
Convention: what is the extent of the term "disability" and who is to be the judge
of it? Not only can the inability problem be thus solved, but such a solution would
provide for flexibility and speedy action in actual cases of disability and would
permit a solution without resort to the difficult process of constitutional amendment.
This is the solution likely to be proposed in the Eighy-fifth Congress as the Celler-
Keating Resolution because it is the solution which accords with the views of the
committee's chairman and ranking minority member-Emanuel Celler and Ken-
neth B. Keating7
70 In cases in which individual rights depend on executive action, the individual has the right to
resort to the law for a remedy. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U. S. (I Cranch) 137, 170 (1803); United
States ex rel. Boynton v. Blaine, 139 U. S. 306, 326 (i89r); In re Cooper, 143 U. S. 472, 503 (1892).
But the question must arise in a case involving actual litigants. Clough v. Curtis, 134 U. S. 361, 372
(189o). On the other hand, the courts might decide that the question was political and submitted to
the successor's discretion alone. If the courts decide this, they will hold that they arc bound to follow
the successor's decision. Luther v. Borden, 48 U. S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
"' See note 64 supra. It is a well-established rule of construction that enumeration in the Constitu-
tion of certain powers denies all others unless incident to an express power and necessary for its execution.
United States v. Harris, io6 U. S. 629, 635-36 (1883); 3 JosEPH SToRY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CoN-
STITI)TION oF TIM UNITn STATES § 1243 (x833).
"Hearings before Special Subcommittee to Study Presidential Inability of the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 84 th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 20-21, 33-34, 46 (x956), and Plan D, id. at 5.
